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111. B E R G M A N N  O N  P E R C E I V I N G ,  S E N S I N G ,  
A N D  A P P E A R I N G  
DAN CRAWFORD 
N this study I am going to present and discuss I some of the central themes of Gustav Berg- 
- 
mann's theory of perception. I shall be concerned, 
however, only with "later Bergmann," that is, 
with the perceptual theory worked out in a series of 
essays in which Bergmann shifts from phenome- 
nalism to a form of intentional realism. This label 
("intentional realism") indicates the two dominant 
themes in Bergmann's later thought about percep- 
tion: perceivings are analyzed as mental acts 
(thoughts) which are intentionally related to real 
and mind-independent objects and states of affairs. 
In a timely essay, " Intentionality" (1955)~~ 
Bergmann presented an impressive defense of men- 
tal acts, and although the framework of that essay 
was still phenomenalistic, the structural analysis of 
mental acts and their intentionality presented there 
has not been significantly altered by Bergmann in 
later writings. In two subsequent essays, "Acts" 
(1960) and "Realistic Postscript" (1963) his 
realistic turn was worked out in detail in the con- 
text of giving a satisfactory account of ordinary 
perceptual experience. These three essays will 
comprise the core texts of the study that follows.2 
Bergmann's perceptual theory has not received 
its fair share of attention from the majority of con- 
temporary analytic philosophers of perception. I 
can think of two reasons whv this is so. First. there is 
the problem of the approachability of Bergmann's 
theory. His two most important essays on percep- 
tion, "Acts" and "Realistic Postscript," are rather 
obscurely situated in a collection of essays which 
contains a formidable line-up of ontological and 
historical topics. And once the perceptual theory 
has been located within the texts, there is then the 
more difficult problem of isolating it from the 
ontological system in which it is firmly embedded. 
An added handicap is that in doing this one must 
cut through a great deal of terminology and coarse 
style to behold the theory in its essentials. 
A second reason for the lack of widespread dis- 
cussion of Bergmann's thought is that Bergmann 
himself has tended to be out of sympathy with the 
prevailing methods and problem-areas of recent 
discussion in the philosophy of mind. One of my 
goals is to show that Bergmann is not as far re- 
moved from the main currents of recent discussion 
as one might think. Through patient exposition 
and careful criticism, I shall try to show where 
there is common ground between Bergmann and 
other strands in the philosophy of perception, and 
also where I believe Bergmann has made valuable 
contributions to the current debate. 
I shall begin with a sketch of Bergmann's con- 
cept of veridical perception. This first section will be 
largely expository and foundational, setting the 
stage for later discussion. Its initial aim is to 
acquaint the reader with "the act" and its mental 
properties, but it also includes a short discussion of 
Bergmann's conception of the objects of perceptual 
acts. In the following sections, I shall present 
Bergmann's views on perceptual error and appearing, 
and on sensations, and work from them toward what 
I believe to be a more adequate understanding of 
these concepts. 
VERIDICAL PERCEPTION : ( I )  THE MENTAL ACT 
The fundamental idea underlying Bergmann's 
account of veridical perceptions is that they should 
be viewed as a species of mental act (thought) 
intending nonmental and actual states of affairs, 
also called "facts." Thoughts, i.e., individual 
thinkings, are construed as (bare) particulars 
exemplifying two "simple " mental properties : a 
propositional attitude (Int, 7, 28; Acts, 36)3 and 
1 Gustav Bergmann, "Intentionality" in Meaning and Existence (Madison, 1960), pp. 3-38; "Acts" and "Realistic Postcript" 
occur in Logic and Reality (Madison, 1964), pp. 3-44 and 302-340 respectively. Hereafter, references to these three essays will be 
included in the body of the text in the following abbreviated fashion: (Int, 3), (Acts, 4), (RP, 302). 
a The general theory of acts, couched in a frame of intentional realism, worked out in these essays, is also maintained in 
Bergmann's more recent book, Realism (Madison, 1967). 
8 Bergmann refers to the "species" of an act, or to its "mode of awareness," rather than its "propositional attitude." 
Copyright © 1982 North American Philosophical Publications, Inc. 
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what Bergmann refers to as a ccpropositional 
character" (Int, 28). In holding that mental acts 
exhibit these two nonrelational properties, Berg- 
mann is rejecting G. E. Moore's claim that mental 
acts are diaphanous. 
When Bergmann says that mental acts have 
propositional characters, he is committing himself 
to the idea that propositions or judgments enter 
into perceptions. He refers to these unique propo- 
sitional properties of acts by means of a quoting 
device which forms new predicates out of sentences : 
thus he would speak of a "this-is-green" mental 
act.4 Since the intentionality of thoughts is not one 
of the topics of this essay, I shall have very little to 
say about these unique intentional properties. I 
shall simply assume that individual thought- 
episodes do have a propositional property, and I 
shall refer to this property by means of Bergmann's 
special predicates (e.g., " this-is-green") . 
Now let us turn to the other simple property of 
acts, the propositional attitude. Bergmann holds 
that a thought always has the property of being, 
e.g., a perceiving, a believing, a thinking of, a 
doubting whether, a sensing, e t ~ . ~  I t  should be 
noted that in the case of perceiving, Bergmann 
allows that the mental property in question may be 
the specific types of perceiving: visual, tactile, etc. 
(Acts, 36). He thinks it is necessary to introduce 
these mental properties to account for certain 
introspectible differences among mental acts which 
have the same propositional character. Now I do 
believe that Bergmann is on good ground in making 
such a claim, at  least in regard to perception. For I 
do not see how it can be denied that there are 
noticeable differences, which anyone can detect 
and report about, between the mental experiences 
as experiences of perceiving that something is green 
and merely thinking that it is green. I shall take it 
that Bergmann's mental property, being aperceiving, 
refers to this introspectible perceptual character of the 
former kind of experience. However, I shall later 
call into question the idea that this perceptual 
character of some mental states is "simple," if this 
means that it cannot be defined in terms of other 
mental concepts. 
Now if, as Bergmann says, being a perceiving 
describes a nonrelational property of a mental act, 
then it dawns immediately that his conception of 
perceiving (and hence of seeing) differs radically 
from that of most contemporary philosophers. For 
it is generally accepted that the ordinary concept of 
seeing is one which describes a knowledge-relation 
between an observer and an actual object: seeing- 
that is taken to be a specific kind of knowing-that. 
Bergmann, however, uses "see" in such a way that 
I .  S sees that this is green 
does not imply that this is green. The concept of 
seeing pertains solely to a mental act, and does not 
carry any implication about the truth of the propo- 
sition involved in that act, nor about the grounds 
or justification for accepting that proposition. 
Now Bergmann might argue, in defense of this 
usage, that there is some basis in common speech 
for construing the notion of seeing in the way that 
he does, and not as a type of knowing. I t  is natural 
for someone to say, for example, that he had seen a 
ghost, or an unidentified flying object, even when 
he has good grounds for believing, or even knows, 
that what was seen in these cases did not exist. 
However, granting that these are correct uses of 
"see," it is still questionable whether the perceptual 
verb in these contexts is being used to describe a 
property of a mental state as Bergmann suggests. 
For it should be noted that in the above contexts, it 
would be equally appropriate for the subject to re- 
port what he seemed to see, or what appeared to him 
("There appeared to be a ghost there"). But I 
shall later interpret Bergmann as saying that these 
seems-statements and appears-statements do not 
function solely to describe a mental property of a 
mental state, but also to call into question the truth 
or falsity of that mental state. Consequently, it 
seems that Bergmann's use of "see" and "per- 
ceive" to refer to an introspectible feature of a 
mental state is a technical use of these expressions 
without any clear basis in common speech. Of 
course there is nothing wrong with using ordinary 
terms in special ways, as long as, when one is done, 
things hang together in the way they are supposed 
to. 
One interesting consequence of Bergmann's use 
of "see" is that it becomes correct to say that cases 
of both veridical and nonveridical perception are 
4 I have added hyphens to Bergmann's single quotes to make these unique predicates more conspicuous to the reader. These 
predicates may be viewed as technical expressions whose ordinary language equivalents are the that-clauses which occur in such 
ordinary contexts as: "George's thinking that this is green occurred at t." 
6 I take it that the same mental act may instantiate more than one attitude, although Bergmam does not, to my knowledge, deal 
with this question. It seems we must allow that the very same act which is a perceiving that this is a chair may also be a believ- 
ing that this is a chair, which for Bergmann is a distinct kind of act. 
B E R G M A N N  O N  P E R C E I V I N G ,  S E N S I N G ,  A N D  A P P E A R I N G  1°5 
cases of seeing. For since the mental states, con- 
sidered as mental states, that occur in veridical 
perception could well be identical in kind with 
those that occur in nonveridical perception (if the 
subject is deceived), then both would exhibit the 
property of being a seeing in Bergmann's sense. 
Now I pointed out above that I believe it is neces- 
sary to speak of some mental acts as having a 
perceptual character in order to distinguish them from 
other nonperceptual acts. And certainly the acts 
involved in appearings exhibit this same perceptual 
quality. However, I shall argue that there is a 
profounder reason for grouping appearings and 
veridical seeings under the common head of per- 
ceiving~ as Bergmann does. In doing so, I shall 
defend the view, which differs from Bergmann's, 
that the concept of a perceiving as a knowing is the 
basic concept in our ordinary beliefs about per- 
ception, and that the concept of an appearing pre- 
supposes it. 
Bergmann's account of the objects of ordinary 
perceptions turns on a key distinction between two 
types of perceiving ( I  and 2) that differ in respect 
of their intentional objects. The intended objects of 
perceivings,, Bergmann says, are such "ordinary 
things" as chairs and tables. Hence the proposi- 
tional characters of these perceptual acts are about 
ordinary things, e.g., " this-is-a-table." A perceiv- 
ing,, on the other hand, intends (in the case of 
vision) an area-particular (RP, 319) rather than a 
whole object. Bergmann introduces the notion of 
a perceiving, and its object by making a pheno- 
menological point about perceivings, : 
When I perceive, the table, my "attention does not 
center" on any of the particulars "in" it that may or 
may not on this occasion be presented to me. 
He continues : 
But we all are, when perceiving2, capable of shifting to 
another act whose intention is the fact of some parti- 
cular (or particulars) exemplifying some properties 
(and relations). These particulars are all "in" the 
table; . . . The species of [this act] is again perceiving. 
. . . Yet [its intention] is characteristically "narrower" 
than that of the preceding perceiving,. An act with 
such an intention I call a perceiving,. (RP, 314.) 
Here I take Bergrnann to be saying, correctly, 
that while observing a table, we are capable of 
shifting to another perceptual act in which what is 
seen is a fact about some area-particular. One might 
achieve this state by focusing more narrowly on the 
facing surface of the table. The propositional 
character of such an induced minimal perceiving 
would be expressed by a sentence of the form 
This area-particular has such-and-such proper- 
ties. 
However, it should be apparent that Bergmann 
in the above passage is making a much stronger 
claim than this phenomenological one. He is in fact 
maintaining that the intentional objects of per- 
ceiving~, can be analyzed in terms of a set of partic- 
ulars having observable properties. He goes on to 
say that what has been said about perceivings, 
"provides a cue for assaying the intentions of per- 
ceiving~,," and then proceeds to analyze ordinary 
objects (or rather facts pertaining to them) as 
follows. (Here I must include a rather lengthy and 
tortured passage, as it introduces ter&nblogy 
without which the reader will be lost in later 
discussion.) 
Let 'Mp' be the sentence representing the fact that 
would have been presented to me if the act had been a 
perceiving, instead of a perceiving,. Let 'a,,. . ., a,' 
stand for the particulars "in" it and, whenever it 
helps, write ' Mp(al, . . . , a,) ' instead of ' Mp'. The 
letter 'My in 'Mp' is to remind us that the fact is 
molecular. The letter 'p' is to recall 'part'. For I assay 
P (This is a table), which is the intention of the per- 
ceiving, with which we are concerned, as a conjunction 
of two (part) facts. One is Mp; the other I call Op. 
That makes 'P' an abbreviation for 'Mp. Op'. The 
letter ' 0' is to remind us that ' Op' contains operators. 
Op, the operator part of P, is very complex indeed. 
Fortunately we need no details. The idea is easily 
grasped. 'Op' schematically states that there are all 
the particulars which must be there, that these parti- 
culars have all the properties they must have, and that 
they stand in all the relations in which they must 
stand, among themselves and to the particulars in the 
molecular part, if the latter is to be "in" a table. 
(RP, 314-315.) 
I n  this passage, Bergmann is putting forward the 
improbable idea that the area-particular(s) which I 
would perceive, if I were perceiving, (Mp), is the 
core ingredient of what I do perceive when I per- 
ceive, the whole table. This claim carries with it the 
idea that the only particulars which are "present" 
to me when I perceive a table are those which con- 
stitute its facing surface. 
Now I believe that Bergmann gets on the wrong 
track in attempting to analyze the ordinary objects 
of perceivings, in terms of the objects of the 
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corresponding perceivings,. For it seems to me a 
mistake (although I shall not try to prove that it is) 
to think that the area-particulars seen in perceiv- 
ings, are in any sense parts or constituents of ordinary 
objects. The area-particulars which Bergmann 
thinks are seen in normal perceptions are actually 
very special objects seen in very special circum- 
stances (usually experimental situations). Hence 
Bergmann's error does not lie in thinking that 
area-particulars can be perceptual objects, but in 
taking them as the "cue" to the perception of 
ordinary objects. 
In the remainder of this essay, I shall be con- 
cerned primarily with instances of perceiving,, 
where the intentional objects are ordinary things. I 
shall argue that the notion of a perceiving, is a use- 
ful one only because of the role it plays in helping us 
to understand the concept of a sensation. 
For Bergmann, there are two kinds of perceptual 
error: qualitatiue and existential. In the former, some 
actual thing appears to be other than it is, whereas 
in the latter, there appears to be something which 
does not actually exist, as in hallucinations. I shall 
limit my discussion to Bergmann's concept of quali- 
tative appearing. 
We have seen that cases of perceptual error are 
to be construed as perceiuings in Bergmann's sense, 
and that they could involve the same propositions 
as veridical perceivings. The difference between 
veridical and nonveridical mental acts is that the 
proposition involved in the former is true, and in the 
latter false. 
Bergmann's main concern is with the ontologi- 
cal implications of this epistemic difference. He 
claims that in cases of error where we are not 
related to an actual state of affairs, we are never- 
theless still related to something, namely a non- 
actual state of affairs, or as he puts it, somewhat 
paradoxically, a "possible fact." The essential 
point is put this way: "In assaying [qualitative 
error] there is only one hurdle to overcome. One 
must recognize that possibilities exist'' (RP, 321). 
Let us look at how Bergmann explains this point 
about qualitative appearing in a particular case. 
We should note that his entire discussion of error 
turns on the preceding analysis of perceivings,. 
The example given is the following: 
I perceive, an oval coin. Surprised that there should 
be such a thing, I reach for it, examine it, perceivea6 it 
to be round. The ' Op' of the original perceiving, is 
false. How about its 'Mp'? Let a be the particular 
(area) "in" it that was presented to me. 'a is round', 
I have now reason to believe, is true; 'a is oval', false. 
The latter is a conjuction term of ' Mp'. That makes 
MP, too, a mere possibility. But the external particular in 
Mp is real. (RP, 3 I 9.) 
Though we have already been introduced to the 
terminology in this it is nevertheless so 
compressed that a commentary is necessary. I offer 
the following construction of what is being said. 
In this example, the perceptual judgment in- 
volved in the original perceiving, is expressed by 
the false sentence "this is an oval coin." In making 
this judgment, the perceiver is intending something 
about all the particulars in the coin, including of 
course the area-particular in the facing surface. 
Now in the above passage, Bergmann suggests that 
the perceiver, when judging, that this is an oval 
coin, is at the same time making a second judgment, 
which corresponds to Mp in the object, namely the 
judgment that a is oval. Hence he seems to be 
- - 
assuming, tacitly, that when one judges that some- 
thing is an oval coin, he is committed to the further 
judgment that the particular in the facing surface 
of the coin is oval.' 
On this interpretation, Bergmann's point comes 
to this: since both of the judgments involved in this 
perceptual experience are false, then their inten- 
tional objects are merely possible states of affairs. 
However, the individual thing which these possible 
states of affairs concern is actual. The coin is real!8 
Clearly the crux of Bergmann's analysis of per- 
ceptual error lies in his ontological claim about 
6 This is not a typographical error. A perceiving, for Bergmann is the final perception2 in a series of perceivings2 aimed at 
checking the truth of the first perceivinga in that series. The judgment involved in a perceiving, is therefore a justified one. 
~ - (RP, 3;6.) 
7 The situation is really more complicated than Bergmann admits. I am speaking as if MP is how I visually take the facing side 
of an object to be when I see (or seem to see) that object. But this is not necessarily how I think the facing side of the object 
appears. And consequently, neither is it how the area-particular which I would perceivel if I abstracted the facing surface from 
the object would appear. It is really all three of these things that Bergmann is calling Mfi. 
8 The account Bergmann gives of existential appearings (RP, 320-321) leads to a similar conclusion, with the important dif- 
ference that the individuals which the intended possible states of affairs concern are not real. If I perceive a ghost, the nonactual 
ghostly fact which is the intentional object of this perception concerns a nonactual individual ghost. If we accept the idea of 
nonactual facts, then I see no reason to balk at nonactual individuals. 
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possible states of affairs. Although it is not my 
purpose in this essay to determine the ultimate 
status of these intentional objects, I shall conclude 
this section by gathering together the most impor- 
tant claims Bergmann makes about them, and 
commenting briefly on each. 
( I )  Possible states of affairs have ontological 
status, though they are not actual. (2) They are 
what mental acts are related to in nonveridical 
perception. (3) In perceptual cases, they are rich, 
sensuous states of affairs, which may be indistin- 
guishable from the perceptible facts constituting 
ordinary objects. 
Bergmann is on firm ground, I believe, in making 
each of these claims. I am in agreement with (I)  
and (2) because it seems that if one accepts the idea 
that mental acts have a propositional or judg- 
mental character, as I do, then one is automatically 
committed to the intentional objects which those 
judgments are about, and to which one must make 
some sort of existential reference. Bergmann re- 
minds us that we must distinguish the act and its 
object, the perceiving and the perceived. If I seem 
to see a ghost at my window, that which I seem to 
see, this ghost, is certainly distinct from the act or 
perceptual experience which intends that object 
and through which I see it. Moreover, concerning 
(3), the claim that the intentional objects of per- 
ceiving~ have a "sensuous" character, it is diffi- 
cult to deny that the states of affairs intended by 
perceptual acts, veridical and nonveridical, are 
qualitatively different from those intended by non- 
perceptual acts such as mere thinkings. 
It seems that we must accept, provisionally at 
least, the conclusion that the intentional facts of 
which Bergmann speaks exist in some sense, though 
they are not actual. 
Bergmann's primary concern, in his discussion of 
perceptual error, was to arrive at an adequate 
ontology of appearing. The burden of his analysis of 
cases of nonveridical perception was to show that 
in these cases the existence of nonactual states of 
affairs must be admitted. In this section, I shall 
move beyond Bergmann's rather circumscribed 
ontological concerns and ask whether or not some 
general theory or definition of the meaning of 
appears-statements can be elicited from Bergmann's 
account. 
One serious limitation of that account is that it is 
restricted to cases of perceptual error, where there 
appears to be something which does not actually 
exist. Although I shall initially work within this 
framework of mere apiearings, my long-range goal 
is to construct, if possible, a more general theory of 
appearing which will have application also to cases 
in which what appears to be the case is the case. 
Before beginning this project, it will be helpful 
to review in a general way what Bergmann has 
said about appearing. An important feature of his 
account is that he has tended to assimilate appear- 
i n g ~  and their objects to veridical perceivings and 
their objects. He has done this by emphasizing that 
the mental states, or more exactly acts, involved in 
these two kinds of experiences could be identical, 
that is, they could exhibit the same propositional 
and perceptual character. In addition, he has said 
that the objects of these two experiences, viz., 
states of affairs, might be the same states of affairs 
in that they might be perceptually indistinguish- 
able, and expressed by the same statement, al- 
though they differ in respect of their "mode" of 
existence. In the remainder of this section I shall 
explore this assimilation of nonveridical to veridi- 
cal perceiving and also argue that it must be 
strengthened in a way that Bergmann himself 
would not allow. 
The following general picture of the meaning of 
appears-statements seems to emerge from Berg- 
mann's discussion. If we say of George: 
2. There (merely) appears to George to be an 
oval coin before him, 
then we are asserting two things: (a) we are 
describing George's occurrent visual experience as 
being a perceiving that there is an oval coin before 
him (where "perceiving" in this context has Berg- 
mann's technical, nonepistemic sense in which it 
describes a mental property). More exactly, we are 
characterizing ~ e o k e ' s  experience as being a per- 
ceptual one, and as having a certain specific 
propositional character (" this-is-an-oval-coin ") . 
1n addition, (b) we are making an epistemic judg- 
ment that the proposition involved in this experi- 
ence is false and hence that George (his act) is not 
related to an actual state of affairs. 
And if George were to make a corresponding 
report about his own experience: 
3. There (merely) appears to me to be an oval 
coin over there, 
he too would be describing the kind of experience 
he was having, as well as asserting its falsity. 
On  this showing, then, statements about mere 
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appearings have both a descr$tive and an epistemic 
function: they describe the subject's occurrent 
experience, and also deny the truth of the proposi- 
tional content of that experience. 
I t  may help to clarify this interpretation of Berg- 
mann if we express it in terms of the ontological 
framework of mental acts. When George reports, 
as in (3), that there merely appears to be an oval 
coin before him, Bergmann seems to be saying that 
his mental state includes two distinct acts.   here is. 
first, George's perceiving (in Bergmann's sense) that 
the coin is oval, and secondly, hisjudging about this 
perceiving that it is false, i.e., that its object is a 
possible fact. 
Now I believe that this account of mere appear- 
ings, which I am attributing to Bergmann as being 
very much in the spirit of his remarks, does provide 
us with all but one of the essential insights needed 
to construct an adequate and general theory of 
appearing. First of all, Bergmann is surely right in 
holding that appears-statements have the descrip- 
tive role he gives them. When someone reports in a 
perceptual situation that something x appears to 
have some property5 then whatever else he might 
be saying, he is at least reporting his occurrent 
experience. Moreover, it is correct to say that the 
proposition that he ascribes to his experience has 
the form "x is f " (rather than " x  appears f "). And 
finally, I think Bergrnann is right in linking the 
concept of appearing with the concepts of truth and 
falsity, though as we shall see, this connection is 
somewhat more complicated than Bergmann 
recognizes. However, the fundamental mistake of 
this account, as I shall argue in a moment, is that it 
fails to recognize a more intimate connection that 
exists between appearing, in general, and veridical 
seeing. 
At this point in the discussion, if we are to 
achieve our goal of finding a general theory of 
appearing, we must find some way of dealing with 
the fact that not all appearings are mere appearings, 
and not all appears-statements imply that their 
constituent propositions are false. Thus someone 
might say, while looking at a green wall in normal 
conditions : 
4. This wall appears green to me, and of course 
it is green. 
In this case, the proposition that the wall is green is 
true. 
Moreover, as this example shows, we cannot say 
that it is at least always part of the meaning of 
appears-statements that they call into question the 
truth of their constituent propositions; for although 
appears-statements are often used to express doubt 
about what appears, this cannot be what these 
statements mean, since they can be correctly used 
even when the s~eaker has no doubt whatsoever 
about the truth of their propositions. The general 
point seems to be that if one asserts that x appearsf, 
he does not thereby commit himself to either the 
truth or the falsity of the proposition that x is$ 
We may now ask: is it possible to give an 
account of appearing which is consistent with this 
point, but at the same time retains Bergmann's 
insight that the concept of appearing is an episte- 
mic one involving in some way the notion of truth? 
The alternative would seem to be to abandon the 
link between a$pearing and truth, and hold that 
there is at least one important sense of "appears" 
in which it has a purely descriptive role, i.e., 
simply describes the subject's occurrent experience. 
Now I do not see that we are driven to this 
alternative, for I hold that we can, and should, 
explicate the concept of appearing as an epistemic 
one, by means of the concept of veridical& perceiving. 
The basic idea of the view I wish to defend is that 
when someone judges how something appears he is 
assimilating the perceptual state he is in to a 
corresponding state of actually perceiving. How- 
ever, it is crucial to realize that the concept of per- 
ceiving which I am employing is not ~ e k a n n ' s  
concept of perceiving (i.e., it does not name a 
simple mental property), nor is it even what Berg- 
mann would refer to as veridical seeing (i.e., it 
does not simply describe a relation between a 
mental act and an actual object). Rather perceiving, 
on my account, has the sense of knowing, and carries 
with -it the implication that the in- 
volved in the perceiving is not only true, but justi- 
fiably accepted. In attempting to understand 
appearings in terms of the notion of perceiving as 
knowing, I am departing fundamentally from 
Bergmann's view. 
I stated in the last paragraph that when some- 
one makes an appears-judgment he assimilates his 
experience to that of actually perceiving. The 
judgment involves, as it did for Bergmann, both a 
descriptive and an epistemic claim: (a) the subject 
is comparing his experience, as an experience, in both 
its propositional and perceptual character, with 
the experience of actually perceiving the thing in 
question. At the same time, (b) he is checking or 
cancelin.< the normal truth-implication of that 
- 
perceiving. 
To apply this claim to our notorious case of the 
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oval coin: when someone reports that a coin 
appears oval to him, he says, in effect, 
this experience of mine, as an experience, is the same 
as (or closely resembles) the experience involved in 
actually seeing an oval coin, though I do not (for 
whatever reasons) commit myself to the idea that the 
proposition involved in that experience is true (as I 
would if I were actually seeing an oval coin).s 
Now with regard to the epistemic part of the 
meaning of appears-statements, (b) above, it 
should be realized that the checking of the truth- 
implication of one's perceptual state does not imply 
that the subject believes or even suspects that his 
perception is or may be false. I t  is indeed true that 
very often when someone says how something 
ap$ears it is because he has become aware of somk 
uaavorable evidence which casts doubt on his per- 
ception. However, we have seen that it cannot be 
part of the meaning of appears-statements to call 
into question in this way the truth of a perception. 
All that can be said, and all that needs to be said, is 
that in judging how something appears, one does 
not by that judgment commit himself to either the 
truth or the falsity of his perception. And this is 
perfectly consistent with his making another over- 
riding judgment in that situation that the proposi- 
tional content of his experience is indeed true, or 
indeed false. What is important is that the appears- 
judgment cancels the truth of the perception, which 
automatically marks it as an essentially epistemic 
judgment.1° 
As to the descriptive part of the meaning of 
appears-statements, (a) above, it can be seen that I 
agree with Bergmann that in making these state- 
ments one is ascribing a certain propositional 
character and a perceptual character to his 
experience. However, I have argued that one does 
not do this, as it were, directly, but indirectly by 
applying to his experience the concept of a corre- 
sponding seeing which has the characteristics in 
question. I would also agree with Bergmann that 
appearings involve two acts rather than one inas- 
much as an appearing includes a reference to a 
corresponding perceiving which is, so to speak, the 
core act of the appearing, and which is qualified in 
the complex way described above. 
A final observation. The idea that appearings 
should be analyzed in terms of veridical perceivings 
finds support in the fact of ordinary usage that 
sentences of the form " x  looks f (to me now) " are 
usually synonymous with "it is as though I were 
seeing x to be$" The account of appearing I have 
given secures the conceptual dependence suggested 
by this usage. 
What is most important is to retain the idea that 
the concepts of appearing and perceiving are 
essentially bound up with those of knowledge, 
truth, and evidence. Bergmann is in danger of 
losing sight of this fact in failing to recognize the 
conceptual connections that I have stressed. 
In this section I shall explore Bergmann's con- 
cept of sensations and try to determine grounds for 
deciding whether or not this concept is an accept- 
able one. The broad questions I shall put to Berg- 
mann are three: ( I )  what grounds are there for 
thinking that sensations exist? (2) how do we go 
about characterizing sensations? and (3) what role 
do sensations play in perception? But before we 
attempt to decipher Bergmann's claims about 
sensations, it will be helpful to reflect for a moment 
on the general framework into which sensations 
must fit, and specifically, to ask whether the ana- 
lyses we have given of perceiving and appearing place 
limitations on the possible meanings that can be 
given to the concept of sensations. 
In the first place, the realistic assumption of our 
analysis of perceiving, which rests on a fundamental 
dichotomy between the subject's act and its actual 
physical object, places definite restrictions on what 
we can say about sensations. Specifically, within 
this realist framework, we can assume that sensa- 
tions, or sense objects,ll are not identical with, or 
constituents of, the ordinary objects of perceptual 
acts, such as tables and trees. If sense objects do 
play a role in veridical perception, then it is clear 
that they must be "located" in the subject's mental 
s The account of appearing that I have developed is based on the account given by Wilfrid Sellars in "Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind" in Science, Perception and Reality (New York, 1g63), sec. 111, pp. 140--149, and differs only in minor respects 
from it. 
lo Sentences such as (4) above, "This wall appears green to me, and of course it is green," sound odd because one who uses the 
sentence is granting in the second clause what the first clause suggests he refuses to grant. Cf. "Mary will probably arrive to- 
night, and in fact Mary will arrive tonight." 
11 I am here anticipating Bergmann in speaking of sense objects (Bergmann uses the term "sense data"). For the moment, we 
may think of them as the entities that are sensed in a sensation. 
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experience as an experience. And to be sure, Berg- 
mann holds that sense objects are mental entities in 
the sense that they are mind-dependent (exist only 
so long as the subject is having them) and private 
(can only be directly known by the subject who has 
them). 
Moreover, whenwe consider how sensationsmight 
figure in nonveridical perception, we arrive at parallel 
conclusions. For we interpreted mere appear- 
i n g ~  as mental acts intending perceptual states of 
affairs: when there appears to be a green spot be- 
fore me, then my (false) perceptual judgment 
("this is a green spot ") is intentionally related to a 
nonactual state of affairs (this being a green spot). 
And there does not seem to be any justification for 
identifying the perceptual fact of something's being 
a green spot with an object of sensation. At least 
Bergmann does not make any such identification. 
How exactly do sensations function in the per- 
ceptual experience? This is a question on which 
our analyses of appearing and perceiving have so 
far shed very little light. We saw that appears- 
statements do describe one's experience, but only 
indirectly, by assimilating it to the experience 
involved in a corresponding perceiving. And al- 
though we did distinguish the propositional and 
nonpropositional components of the perceptual 
experience, we have not yet found any way of 
directly characterizing the nonpropositional com- 
ponent except to say, with Bergmann, that per- 
ceptual acts exhibit the property being a perceiving. 
But while saying this does mark the difference be- 
tween perceptual and nonperceptual acts such as 
thinking and believing, it does not show us any way 
of characterizing the spec@ features of the nonpropo- 
sitional component of perceptual experience. I shall 
argue below that we can describe these specific 
features by coming to a proper understanding of 
sensations and their properties. 
We turn now to Bergmann's account of sensa- 
tions as he presents it in the two essays, "Acts" and 
"Realistic Postscript." Bergmann bases his argu- 
ment for sensations on certain facts of introspec- 
tion; he holds that sensations can be discovered in 
one's mental state (or as he says, "conscious state") 
by performing a mental shift. What one notices 
while in this special mental set are certain colorful 
entities or "sense data" existing momentarily in 
one's conscious state. However, the role that these 
sense data play in perception is obscure in Berg- 
mann's theory. The crucial claim is that sense data 
do not figure in the analysis of perceivings: per- 
ceiving~ can be fully explicated in terms of mental 
acts and their intentional objects. Because of this, 
Bergmann concludes that "dialectically it makes no 
difference whatsoever whether or not there are 
sense data" (RP, 325, italics omitted). 
In presenting his idea of sense data, Bergmann 
uses his earlier distinction between perceiving I 
and 2. To refresh the reader's memory, we said that 
a perceiving, intends a whole physical object while 
a perceiving, intends only the constituent particu- 
lars which can be more narrowlv focused on-in 
the case of vision, the area-particulars "in" the 
facing surface. In addition, Bergrnann makes a key 
use of the notion of externality, which he takes to be a 
characteristic of all perceived, and perceived, 
objects, but not of sensed objects. Here are the 
relevant passages : 
Everyone can make the shift from perceiving, to per- 
ceiving,. . . . The molecular fact intended by a per- 
ceiving, (of mine) still presents the "idea of external 
existence.". . . Whatever else may or may not be 
"in" [my conscious state], the molecular fact, its 
intention [MA, certainly is not. (RP, 325.) 
He continues : 
To claim that there are sense data is to claim that, just 
as we can shift from perceiving, to perceiving,, we can 
make a second shift, in the same direction, as it were, 
from perceiving,. . . . If the intention from which you 
--
shifted is Mp, call this conscious state Mj. Mp is 
exactly like Mp. Only the [externality] has disap- 
peared! This conscious state @ is a sense datum. 
(RP' 325.) 
The most plausible interpretation of the second 
shift Bergmann describes, from perceiving, to 
sensing, is that it is a shift from seeing something 
which is not in one's conscious state to seeing (or 
sensing) something which is in one's conscious 
state. This is why Bergmann stresses the fact that 
the object of the perceiving, is not in one's con- 
scious state. Further, even though the objects of the 
perceiving, and the sensing are "exactly like" one 
another, Bergmann distinguishes them on the 
grounds that the perceived object, but not the 
sensed object, "presents the idea of external 
existence." How does this notion of the presence or 
absence of externality shed light on sensations? 
While Bergmann takes the "idea of external 
existence" as presented by an object to be a simple 
datum of consciousness (RP, 3") it is natural to 
interpret this notion in terms of the idea that the 
object that one sees (or seems to see) is in physical 
space. If this is correct, then in claiming that the 
objects of sensation do not present the idea of 
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externality, Bergmann would be saying, plausibly, 
that when one shifts from a perceiving to a sensing 
the sensed object is no longer spatially separated 
from the subject in the way that the perceived object 
was: the sensed object is not (or does not appear to 
be) in physical space. 
Now it is difficult to deny the introspective facts 
to which Bergmann is calling attention, namely 
that we can come to notice the visual objects he 
describes by changing our mental set. Moreover, it 
seems correct to say that these objects are not seen 
as being in physical space, viz., they are not in the 
vicinity of or near the surface of the objects we were 
looking at before shifting into our phenomenologi- 
cal frame of mind. Hence I conclude that Berg- 
mann has given us some reason for thinking that 
sense data exist. Furthermore, it would seem to be a 
justifiable inference that sense data are present in 
all perceptions, since whenever we are perceiving 
we are capable of noticing them by shifting into the 
proper mental set.12 But still, it is not at all clear 
what role, if any, sense data play in perception, and 
how they are connected with perceptual acts. 
Specifically, we may wonder whether it is any 
longer necessary to say that perceptual acts have 
the simple property perceiving, once it is recognized 
that sense data always accompany these acts in 
one's conscious state. 
My objections to Bergmann's conception of sense 
data are two. First, it obscures the role of sensations 
in perception and ultimately leads to the idea that 
they are irrelevant to a philosophical under- 
standing of ordinary perceiving, as happens with 
Bergmann. Secondly, it loses sight of an essential 
feature of the perceptual experience as an experi- 
ence, namely that it has the same kind of sensory 
properties that Bergmann ascribes to sense data. 
What I am suggesting is that it is the perceptual 
experience as a whole which may be said to have 
sensory properties (as well as a propositional 
character). 
However, this claim must be qualified in an 
important respect. We must take into account 
something which Bergmann overlooks, namely 
that mental entities, of whatever sort, are not things 
that can have sensory properties. A sense datum, 
for example, cannot be literally green and tri- 
angular since these properties pertain primarily to 
physical objects in space. Hence what must be said 
about inner experiences is that they have properties 
(let us call them phenomenal properties) which are 
different from, but analogous to, physical sensory 
properties such as color and shape.13 I t  is these 
phenomenal properties which, I am arguing, may 
be ascribed to the perceptual experience. If I am 
right about this, then a correct description of the 
experience that occurs in the perception of a green 
triangle is that it has, first, the propositional 
character " this-is-a-green-triangle" (cum attitude), 
and second, unique sensory properties analogous 
to greenness and triangularity. 
But there is no reason why we should not refer to 
the sensory or nonpropositional component of the 
perceptual experience as the subject's sensation. 
That is, we seem to have found a useful and com- 
monsensical concept of a sensation as a component 
part of the perceptual experience. Indeed, once this 
suggestion is taken seriously, then it dawns on us 
that the introspective evidence pertaining to sense 
data that Bergrnann brings forth does not justify 
his inference that sense data and perceptual act are 
distinct entities. For all Bergmann has shown, it is 
quite possible that when one makes the shift from a 
perceiving to a sensing, he is coming to notice 
properties of his perceptual act. 
I shall try to defend my nonBergmannian concept 
of a sensation, and specifically the idea that it has 
the phenomenal features I described, by drawing 
on one of our conclusions about appearings. I 
argued earlier that in making appears-reports, one 
is comparing his experience with that of a corre- 
sponding seeing. Moreover, I suggested that the 
subject is able to recognize the respects in which his 
experience resembles and differs from that related 
experience. If this was correct, then the report that 
there appears to be a green triangular object over 
there involves the claim that 
1' What should be said about Bergmann's perceiving, ? Has he succeeded in describing an intermediate stage between per- 
ceiving whole objects (or rather the facing surfaces of whole objects) and coming to sense sense data-a stage in which one 
sees an expanse or area as being in external physical space? Perhaps it is necessary to pass through such a stage in coming to 
notice our inner experiences; but I would argue that whether it is is a phenomenological question which, to use a Bergmannian 
turn ofphrase, is dialectically irrelevant to the question of sense data and their characteristics. 
as Wilfrid Sellan describes the analogy between physical and phenomenal color and shape in terms of common logical and 
structural features in "The Structure of Knowledge: ( I )  Perception" (unpublished), p. 20. I would add that these physical and 
phenomenal properties are disanalogous as regards their causal features. 
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this perceptual experience (of mine) as an experi- 
ence resembles the experience involved in actu- 
ally seeing a green triangular object over there 
in respect of its greenness and triangularity. 
Now in reporting comparatively about the 
greenness and triangularity of one's experience, I 
think it is clear that one is not simply referring to 
the propositional element of the two experiences 
(which does include the concepts green and tri- 
angular). One is also characterizing one's experi- 
ence in its nonpropositional aspect by means of the 
predicates "green" and "triangular." In this way, 
I believe, our analysis of appearings lends support 
to our concept of sensations as that part of the per- 
ceptual experience having properties which are 
counterparts of the perceptible properties of their 
intended objects.14 
Once we have put this concept of sensations to 
use in understanding perceivings, then there is no 
longer any motivation for saying, with Bergmann, 
that the perceptual character of perceivings is a 
simple mental property, for we have succeeded in 
giving a more determinate description of this 
property in terms of sensations. Moreover, if as I 
have claimed, sensations are component parts of 
perceivings, then they are as dialectically relevant 
in giving an analysis of perceiving as is the act 
itself. 
Finally, it is important to realize that my defense 
of sensations has not rested on the claim that they 
are ever observed, i.e., that they are ever perceptual 
objects. All I have said is that one can recognize 
certain things about his mental experience, which 
is simply to say that one can give noninferential 
reports about his experience. And while I cer- 
tainly do not deny the relevance of the introspec- 
tive facts that Bergmann calls attention to, I 
believe I have shown that Bergmann is wrong in 
claiming that these facts are the sole grounds for 
introducing sensations, for I have found other 
common sense considerations which lead to this 
idea. 
To conclude this discussion, I shall review briefly 
some of the more important elements of Berg- 
mann's perceptual theory, as well as where I have 
found them to be in need of revision. ( I )  On the 
important matter of nonveridical perception, Berg- 
mann has made a strong case for saying that the 
intentional objects involved in these perceptions 
exist in some sense, though they are not actual. 
These nonactual states of affairs, he pointed out, 
may be perceptually indistinguishable from actual 
states of affairs. Although Bergmann's concept of 
these nonactual states of affairs is not a wholly 
satisfactory one, he has at least shown us the place 
they occupy in perception, and hence the road that 
any rival theory must travel. 
( 2 )  Bergmann rightly drew attention to the per- 
ceptual character of perceptual acts, which distin- 
guishes them from such nonperceptions as merely 
thinking or believing. However, we found that it 
was not necessary to stop with the idea that being a 
perceiving is a simple mental property of acts, but 
that it could be further explicated in terms of a 
concept of sensations. 
(3) In regard to appearing, although Bergmann 
correctly assimilated the concept of appearing to 
that of veridical perceiving, we found it necessary 
to strengthen this assimilation in such a way that 
appearings must be analyzed in terms of veridical 
perceivings (in the sense of knowings) . 
(4) Concerning sensations, Bergmann has stressed 
the introspective grounds which justify, in part, 
philosophical claims about sensations, thus help- 
ing to secure their place in the philosophy of mind. 
We supplemented his thesis by constructing a dif- 
ferent, but commonsensical, notion of sensations 
which did not rely on introspective evidence, and 
which made sensations an integral part of the per- 
ceptual process. 
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14 I should make it clear that I am not claiming that the concept of sensations that I have given is the only acceptable one, 
philosophically speaking, nor that it is the most penetrating one. Specifically, I do not wish to deny that there are good grounds 
for speaking of sensations as entities (or states) separate from the perceptual experience. In fact, I believe that there are convincing 
reasons for inferring the existence of antecedent sensory states which mediate between the purely physical state and the "full- 
blown" perceptual experience. (See Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics [New York, I 9681, ch. I ,  for a valuable discussion of 
what Sellars calls the "sense impression inference.") One such reason is to give an adequate explanation of the sensory component 
of perception that I have described. But the fact that such theoretical advances are necessary should not blind us to the more 
rudimentary understanding of sensations as the nonpropositional component of perceivings. 
